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1. Introduction 
An Analysis of Still 
Michela Ippolito 
UCSC 
This paper investigates the semantics of the particle still in its aspectual, marginality 
and concessive uses. Typically still is used as an aspectual particle : in ( 1 ), the 
particle contributes the meaning that John was already cooking when the utterance 
was made. 
( 1 )  John i s  still cooking. 
However, not all occurrences of still seem to contribute the same meaning. For 
example, there is a reading of (2) where the implication is that it is earlier than 
expected. I 
(2) It is still five o 'clock. 
The marginality use of still is exemplified in (3) (from Michaelis ( 1993» . The 
sentence asserts that compact cars are fairly safe and locates them on a scale of 
safety with respect to other cars. The sentence suggests that compact cars are not 
particularly safe (even though they are safe), and that safer cars have already been 
discussed in the context in which (3) is uttered. 
(3) Compact cars are still fairly safe ; subcompacts start to get dangerous . 
Last, consider the concessive use of still, as in conditionals and co-ordinate struc­
tures.2 The fact that the presence of even in (4) is optional ,  and that we get the 
same concessive meaning in the coordinate structures in (5) suggests that still is 
responsible for the concessive interpretation.3 
(4) (Even) if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon. 
(5) a. A: John studied all night. 
B: He still failed the test, though. 
b. They helped him, but he still died. 
The fact that in (at least some dialects of) English, as well as in other languages, 
these apparently very different meanings are expressed by a single particle sug­
gests that there is a connection between the occurrences of still presented above. 
Briefly, the theory that I propose in this paper argues the following. Following an 
established tradition, grading particles can be classified in three classes: additive 
particles like also, scalar particles like even, and exclusive particles like only. Their 
contribution to the assertion and the presupposition of the sentence in which they 
occur is schematized in (6), from Krifka ( 1998). The expression in brackets on 
the right represents the presupposition contributed by the particle. F stands for the 
expression associated with the particle. 
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(6) a. [ADDl [ . . .  F . . . ] ] :  [ . . .  F . . .  ] 1  (3F' =I- F [  . . .  F' . . .  j )  
b. [S CALI [ . . .  F . . .  ] ] :  [ . . .  F . . .  ] (-,3F' =I- F[ [  . . .  F' . . .  ] -<likely 
[ . . .  F · · ·lD 
C .  [EXCLl [ . . .  F . . .  ] ] :  -,3F' =I- F [  . . .  F'  . . .  ] ( [  . . .  F . . .  ] )  
The proposal i s  that the uses of still introduced above can be  reduced to these three 
classes. In particular, I will claim that (i) aspectual still is an additive particle, 
similar to too and also; (ii) both marginality and concessive still are scalar particles; 
(iii) as for not-yet still, I will present the hypothesis that not-yet still instantiates the 
third class above, i .e. it is an exclusive particle, in the same class as only. However, 
I will argue that in order to account for the meaning of exclusive still we need to 
revise the schema above in (6-c): I will argue that the expression ([ . . .  F . . . ] ) on the 
right hand side of (6-c) (a real implication of the sentence) should be analysed as 
an implicature and not as a presupposition. This argument has repercussions on the 
analysis of only, which I will briefly mention in section 3 .4. What additive, scalar 
and exclusive still have in common is that all of them express the relation earlier 
(less) than (-<) .  
One part of the proposal is an attempt to derive the presuppositions triggered 
by additive (aspectual) still and scalar (marginality and concessive) still composi­
tionally. In order to capture this fact in a more compositional fashion within a type 
driven semantics, still will be interpreted as a partial function, imposing a partiality 
condition on the expression in its scope. 
In the course of the analysis, I will assume that eventualities may be part of 
the syntactic representation of a sentence, and I will propose a parallel between the 
temporal and the nominal domain. As we can talk about new or familiar individuals 
by employing the distinction between definite and indefinite noun phrases, we can 
talk about new or familiar eventualities.  I will argue that while both the meaning of 
aspectual still and the meaning of again make anaphoric reference to eventualities 
in their presuppositions, they differ in that still is used to make an assertion about a 
discourse-old/familiar eventuality, whereas again is used to make an assertion about 
a new eventuality. 
For lack of space I cannot review in detail two important previous analyses 
of still, i .e .  Lobner ( 1989) and Krifka (2000) . For a critique of Lobner's proposal, 
see Krifka (2000). For a brief sketch of the latter proposal, see the beginning of 
section 2. 1 .4 
2. Aspectual still 
Aspectual still is a presupposition trigger. As shown in (7-c), the proposition that 
John is a UPS employee is true regardless of the truth or falsehood of (7-a) . 
(7) a. John is still a UPS employee. 
b. It is not the case that John is still a UPS employee. 
c .  John was a UPS employee. 
AN ANALYSIS OF STILL 
When we ask the question of what the presupposition triggered by still is there are 
two possibilities :  that it is an existential presupposition or that it is a singular propo­
sition. To answer this question, consider (8) modeled after an example discussed in 
Heim ( 1 990) .5 Suppose that (8) is uttered in a context in which it is assumed that 
John cooks him meals daily. 
(8) When I saw him a couple of days ago, John was cooking. He is still cooking. 
The sentence in (8) triggers the inference that John has been cooking continuously 
for at least two days, even though this inference is pragmatically odd. Suppose 
the presupposition triggered by still were existential ("there is a past time at 
which John was cooking"). Since the inference in which there is a single cooking 
streching over two days is pragmatically odd, and since we are assuming that John 
cooks his meals every day, we expect that no such inference should accompany 
(8). The fact that it does suggests that the presupposition must be a singular 
proposition about a contextually salient cooking. That is to say, what the sentence 
must presuppose is that the cooking that is occurring now overlapped a past time 
too. Assuming a view of presuppositions as admittance conditions6 , the second 
sentence in (8) will be admitted in the common ground only if, at the time when 
it is uttered, the common ground entails that the contextually salient cooking was 
taking place at some past time. Since the first sentence in (8) asserts that a cooking 
by John was going on at some past time, the second sentence will be admitted 
in the common ground with the inference that it is about that very cooking by John.7 
2. 1 .  First steps 
We have established in the preceding section that an anaphoric element is present 
in the presupposition triggered by aspectual still. Upon hearing ( 1 ) ,  we infer that 
John's cooking continued throughout an interval that includes a past time and the 
speech time. In what follows, we will see that this 'universal ' reading should not 
be part of the presupposition. If it were, ( 1 )  would have to presuppose something 
along the lines in (9). Following Krifka (2000), I use the symbol ex: to refer to the 
"abutting" relation. 
(9) a. The contextually salient cooking occurred throughout an interval that 
includes some past time and abuts now. 
b. :Jt :ex:(t , tc) /\ 'Vt' � t [the contextually salient cooking by John occurs 
at t'l 
A good environment to test presuppositions is the antecedent of counterfactuals. 
The presuppositions in the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional must be as­
sumed to be true in the actual world, despite the counterfactuality of the antecedent 
itself! : when the antecedent is known to be false, but the presupposition is known 
to be true the conditional is felicitous; however, when both the antecedent and its 
presupposition are known to be false, the conditional is no longer felicitous .  Now 
consider (10) .  If the antecedent were to presuppose that John is alive throughout an 
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interval that extends in the past and abuts the speech time, then ( 10) would only be 
felicitous in contexts that entail that John is alive throughout an interval that abuts 
now. Since the context we set up for ( 10) does not entail such a proposition, the 
conditional should be infelicitous. But it is not. 
( 10) (John died a year ago.) If John were still alive (now), he would be a hun­
dred years old. 
Therefore, the 'universal ' meaning of aspectual still cannot be part of the presup­
position of the sentence. 
The remarks in the previous and current sections also raise some problems 
for the theory of aspectual particles in Krifka (2000). According to Krifka, 
aspectual particles only indicate a certain restriction of the set of alternatives to the 
focus phrase associated with the particle : these alternative must be ordered and 
different aspectual particles will impose a different ordering. For example, take the 
sentence It is still raining, where the focus is on the whole sentence : according 
to Krifka, the contribution of the particle is to consider the alternative RAIN and 
,RAIN in that order. Krifka is explicit in saying that the alternative proposition 
is not required to be true in the actual world.9 Now, it does not follow from the 
contribution of still that it was raining at any point in the past, which we observed 
is part of what the sentence conveys .  Krifka suggests that the inference that one of 
the alternatives is true is an implicature. However, implicatures (differently from 
presuppositions) do not project in counterfactuals. Therefore, it seems we should 
be able to utter ( 10) felicitously in a context where John was never alive . 10 
2.2. The proposal for aspectual still 
Take our previous example, repeated in ( 1 1 ) .  Intuitively, the sentence asserts that 
John is cooking at the speech time, and presupposes that that very eventuality over­
lapped a past time. 1 1  
( 1 1 )  John i s  still cooking. 
The task of computing the presupposition of this sentence is not trivial ,  as we will 
see below. The most salient feature of the presupposition is that it is generated by 
using material from the sentence: it is this other material in the sentence that de­
termines which type of eventuality the presupposition is about. 12 The question is 
whether and how the presupposition of still can be compositionally derived. Sup­
pose that the position of the particle affects what material in the sentence will con­
tribute to the presupposition, and that the scope of aspectual still is the aspectual 
phrase (AspP), i .e .  all the verbal and aspectual material below Tense (T) . In the case 
of ( 1 1 ), the aspectual head is the imperfective aspect (call it ING). I ignore move­
ment of the subject to [Spec,TP] , and I interpret it in its base position, [Spec,VP] . 
The phrase marked with the subscript F is the focused phrase associated with the 
particle. 
AN ANALYSIS OF STILL 
( 12) [T]F still [AspP ING [vp John cook] ] 
We would like to know, first, how the presupposition is computed, and second, how 
the presupposition relates to the assertion. In particular, since the eventuality is 
brought into the sentence as part of the meaning of the predicate, how is a presup­
position going to be about it? That is to say, how can we account for the intuition 
that the sentence asserts that an eventuality of John's cooking overalps the speech 
time, and presupposes that it overlapped a past time too? 
I assume that you can tum predicates of times into predicates of events 
(Kratzer ( 1 998» . The predicate to cook starts off as a predicate of time as in ( 13 -a), 
and it is then turned into the predicate in ( 1 3-c) by means of ( 1 3-b) . 
( 13 )  a. [cook] C,g (John) = (.Ax . .At. x cooks at t)(John) 
b. For any P of type (i , t) , *p = [.Ae. P(time(e» = 1 ] ,  where time (e) is the 
running time of e. (Kratzer ( 1998» 
c. .Ae . the (running) time of e is a time when John cooks. 
After shifting the property of times into a property of eventualities (see ( 1 3-b) and 
( 13 -c» , we combine the result with ING. However, differently from Kratzer ( 1998), 
I do not tie together the aspectual contribution of the - ING operator and 3-closure 
into the meaning of the operator. 13 I assume that when the ING operator combines 
with the denotation of the VP, the event variable is not 3-closed. This is shown in 
(14) .  
( 14) [ing] C,g = .AP(I ,t) . .Ae . .At. t �time(e) 1\ P(e) = 1 
( 15)  [.AP(I,t) . .Ae . .At . t �time(e) 1\ P (e) = 1 ] (.Ae .  and time(e) is a time when 
John cooks.) 
= .Ae . .At . t  �time(e)/\ time(e) is a time when John cooks. 
Intuitively, the presupposition of still is constructed from material within the sen­
tence itself. In our example, the presupposition is that the cooking by John that is 
going on at the speech time overlapped a past time. The material that is going to 
be part of the presupposition is the material that occurs in the scope of the parti­
cle, in this case AspP. As a way of implementing this idea, I propose that still is a 
partial function introducing a presupposition associated with one of its arguments. 
The idea that I would like to suggest is that still forces both the assertion and the 
presupposiiton to be about the same contextually salient eventuality. Let's assume 
that still is a partial function taking two arguments : the first argument is a covert 
eventuality variable, call it el ; the second argument is the denotation of the AspP (of 
type (l (i ,  t) ) ) .  The partiality condition is imposed on this second argument. What 
the particle returns is a function of type (i ,  t) . The definition in ( 1 6) illustrates how 
this works . 
( 16) [still] C,g = .Ae . .AP(I(it) ) : 3t' E Crt' -< t 1\ P (el ) (t' ) = 1] . P(e l )  
The variable el is the event argument of P (the denotation of  AspP) in both the 
presupposition and the assertion. C is the contextually salient set of alternatives to 
1 3 1  
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the denotation of the associated focused phrase (here Tense ; see the tree below). 
( 17) illustrates the semantic composition in a type-driven semantics. 




(i , t) 
� 
( (l (i , t) , (i , t) ) ASPP(I(i t» 
� 
still 
( (l ( (l (i , t) ) (i , t) ) )  
e l  ING VP 
� 
John cooks 
After merging with tense, we obtain ( 1 8) . 14 Again, P is the denotation of AspP. 
( 1 8) ( [still] C,g {el ) (P)) ( [PRES]C,g ) = defined only if 3t' -< tc [P{el ) {t') = 1] ; 
if defined, ( [still a] C,g {el ) {P) ) ( [PRES] C,g ) = 1 iff P{et ) (tc) = 1 
Given our definition of P in ( 15), ( 1 8) says that the sentence John is still cooking 
presupposes that the running time of a salient eventuality of John's cooking in­
cludes a time before the speech time and asserts of that eventuality that its running 
time includes the speech time. The eventuality variable introduced by still in the 
assertion remains free and not bound by 3-closure. 3-closure cannot occur above 
still since the eventuality argument of P has already been saturated by the covert 
variable el .  3-closure cannot occur below still either, because, if it did, it would 
bind the eventuality variable in the denotation of AspP and still could not combine 
with it. 
To sum up the discussion so far, aspectual still takes scope over AspP and as­
sociates with the tense in the sentence. Its contribution is twofold: on the one hand, 
it contributes a presupposition that the running time of an eventuality el includes a 
time before the reference time (the semantic value of the associated phrase) ;  on the 
other hand, it makes a contribution to the assertion by providing el as the argument 
for the eventuality position of its complement AspP. Since 3-closure can neither 
occur below the particle nor above for type reasons, el will remain free. Conse­
quently, both the assertion and the presupposition will be about a salient eventuality 
of John's cooking, which is presupposed to overlap a past time and which is asserted 
to overlap the speech time. The logical form, truth conditions and presupposition 
of ( 1 1 )  are as follows. 
( 19) [[PRES [[still el]  [lNG John cook]]]] C,g = 1 iff tc � time {e l )A time(el)  
is a time when John cooks; defined only if  3t' E Crt' -< tc A t' c time { e l )  
and time {el )  i s  a time when John cooks. 
If follows correctly that the sentence will be felicitous only if the common ground 
entails that: (a) there is a salient eventuality of cooking by John and (b) the time 
of this eventuality includes a past time. It follows that (i) a sentence like John is 
still cooking cannot be felicitous uttered out of the blue and (ii) the sequence in 
AN ANALYSIS QF STIU 
(8) is understood as talking about a single event stretching over two days, for the 
second clause requires that John's current cooking be salient in the context and 
have overlapped a past time. 
2.3. Still and Again 
Suppose you are describing a situation in which a man orders a coffee and a differ­
ent man pays the check. You cannot describe this situation by using the indefinite a 
man. 
(20) A man ordered a coffee. Another man/#A man paid the check. 
We are not only required to assert the existence of a man who pays the check, 
but we must also signal that this man is different from the man already salient in 
the discourse. This explains why (20) without another is odd. IS If the man who 
ordered the coffee is the same man who payed the check, there are two strategies 
that we can pursue: either to use the pronoun he or to use the definite phrase the 
same man. That is to say, you must either use a noun phrase whose denotation is 
a salient male individual (the pronoun) or you must assert the existence of a male 
individual identical to the salient one. 
(2 1 )  A man ordered a coffee. The same manlhe/#a man paid the check. 
The same constraints work for reference to eventualities. When asserting the exis­
tence of a cooking (by John) in a discourse in which a cooking (by John) is already 
salient, it must be presupposed that this cooking is either the same as or different 
from the past cooking already salient in the context. This expectation is confirmed 
by the necessity of again in (22). 
(22) a. Two days ago John was cooking. #He is cooking. 
b. Two days ago John was cooking. He is cooking again. 
c. Two days ago John was cooking. He is still cooking. 
( ,different' )  
( ' same ' )  
Like still, again triggers an anaphoric presupposition and i t  requires that the 
salient eventuality be past to the reference time. If an assertion is made about 
an eventuality e in a context in which an eventuality of the same type is already 
salient, e must be presupposed to be either the same or different from the salient 
one. In the former case, still is required to occur. In the latter, again must occur. In 
the next section, I will spell out in more details how the presupposition triggered 
by again is computed. 
2.3. 1 .  The presupposition of again 
As shown already in Heim ( 1990), the presupposition of again is anaphoric . Sup­
pose somebody who eats pizza rather frequently utters the sentence in (23). We 
naturally understand Mary's birthday to follow John's birthday. This inference is 
due to the presence of again, since were this particle not there, we could have imag-
1 3 3  
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ine the two birthdays in the opposite temporal order. 
(23) We will have pizza on John's birhtday, so we shouldn' t  have pizza again 
on Mary's  birthday. 
Now, if the presupposition were that there is an occurrence of eating pizza before 
Mary's birthday, it would be satisfied as we are assuming that the speaker is a reg­
ular pizza eater. Therefore, John's birthday would not be necessarily understood 
as preceding Mary's birthday, and we would not have an explanation for why we 
make the inference above. Intuitively, the presupposition triggered by again must 
be a particular proposition, i .e . a proposition that a salient pizza eating event that 
precedes Mary's birthday. This points to the main difference between still and 
again: in the case of still, both the presupposition and the assertion are about the 
same eventuality ; in the case of again, the assertion is about a newly introduced 
eventuality (of some kind), whereas the presupposition is about a different and al­
ready salient eventuality (of the same kind) . How can we couch the similarities and 
differences between these two particles in our analysis? I propose that again, like 
still, is a partial function which takes two arguments: a covert eventuality variable 
el and the denotation of AspP (of type (l (i ,  t) ) ) .  However, differently from still, the 
eventuality variable does not saturate the eventuality argument of P (the denotation 
of AspP) in the assertion. The definition in (24) shows that, while el becomes an 
argument of P in the presupposition, again returns a function of type (l (i , t) ) . The 
type of again is (l ( (l (i ,  t) ) (l (i , t) ) ) ) . 
(24) [again] C,g = Ae . AP(I (i ,t) ) : :It' E Crt' -< t A P (el ) (t' ) = 1] . P(l (i,t) ) 
The tree below shows the steps of the computation: crucially, this time :l-closure 
can and will apply above the particle, binding the eventuality position in the asser­
tion. Notice that :l-closure could not apply below the particle for type reasons (if it 
did, again could not combine with its complement by FA).  
(25) 
:le (l (i ,  t) ) 
� 
( (l (i ,  t) ) (l (i ,  t) ) )  ( l (i , t) ) 
� �  
again el ING (l , t) 
(l ( (l (i , t) ) (l (i ,  t) ) ) )  � 
John cooks 
The truth conditions for (22-b) are given below. Like still, again associates with the 
focused tense phrase, and it requires that there be a time in the focus value of the 
tense phrase that is earlier than the semantic value of the tense phrase . 
(26) ( ( ( [again]C,g (el ) ) ( [:le ING [John cooks]] C,g ) )  ( [PRES] C,g ) )  = defined only 
AN ANALYSIS OF STILL 
if 3t' E Crt' -< teA t' � time ( ed A time ( e l )  is a time when John cooks; if 
defined ( ( ( [again] e,g (el ) ) ( [3e ING [John cooks]] e,g ) ) ( [PRESy,g) )  = 1 iff 
3e2 [te � time(e2) A time(e2) is a time when John cooks. 
On the one hand, the presupposition that again triggers (the partiality condition on 
its second argument) is that there is a time before the reference time (the speech 
time) that is included in the running time of an eventuality el of John's cooking. 
Since el is free, there must be a salient eventuality in the context that satisfies 
the presupposition; i .e . the context must entail that a salient eventuality of John's 
cooking overlapped a past time. On the other hand, the assertion asserts that there is 
an eventuality of John's cooking whose running time includes the speech time. This 
explain the anaphoricity of again, e.g. the inference in Heim's example (23) that 
Mary's birthday follows John's birthday. The presupposition requires there to be 
a salient eventuality of eating pizza preceding the future time of Mary's  birthday. 
In the context in which the second clause is interpreted, there is indeed a salient 
eventuality of such kind, i .e. the eventuality of eating pizza on John's birthday. 
Therefore, because of the need to resolve the anaphora in the presupposition, the 
inference is triggered that John's birthday precedes Mary'S . 16 
3. Scalar still 
Let me sum up what we have discussed so far. We started from the classification of 
grading particles in three groups : additive particles, like too; scalar particles like 
even, and finally exclusive particles, like only. The purpose of this paper is to show 
that the uses of still that I presented in the introduction can be reduced to the three 
types of grading particles in the classification above. In the previous sections I 
argued that aspectual still is an additive particle. In the following two subsections, 
I will argue that marginality and concessive still are scalar particles .  
3. 1 Marginality still 
Consider a variation on the marginality example we introduced at the beginning of 
this paper. 
(27) A: Tell me about sedans, compact and subcompact cars. Are they safe? 
B: Well, sedans are definitely safe. Compact cars are still safe. Subcom­
pacts start to get dangerous. 
A plausible candidate for the scale involved in marginality uses of still is the scale 
of degrees introduced by the adjective in the sentence. Following Kennedy and Mc­
Nally (2002), Kennedy (2003), Heim (2000), among others, I assume that gradable 
adjectives like safe denote relations between individuals and degrees, where de­
grees are "formalized as points or intervals totally ordered along some dimension" 
(Kennedy and McNally (2002» . A totally ordered set of degrees is a SCALE. The 
meaning of the adjective safe is given in (28). 
1 3 5  
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(28) [safe] = Ad . AX . x is safe to a degree d 
The value of the degree argument is determined by degree morphology (for ex­
ample, comparatives, degree modifiers). For sake of simplicity, I will assume that 
when a gradable adjective is not modified, the degree argument is saturated by a 
free variable de whose value is a contextually provided standard of comparison. I7 
In order to illustrate how this meaning is computed, let us go back to our exam­
ple Compact cars are still safe in (27). Let's suppose that still associates with the 
focused phrase compact cars. At LF still moves from its surface position for type 
reasons and takes scope over the whole sentence, leaving a variable of type d be­
hind. The focused phrase moves too and lands just above the particle 's  adjunction 














(d (et) ) 
The definition of still is given here below. The definition of the maximality operator 
max is taken from Heim (2000). What is the value of XEF? XEF is some member, 
both salient and different from compact cars, of the focus value of the NP associated 
with still (compact cars) . 
(30) a. [still] = AP(d,t) : max(Ad. Adj (N PF , d)) -< max(Ad. Adj(xEF , d)). P 
b. max(X) = [l-d.X(d) = 1 A Vd' [X (d') = 1 -+ d' � d] ]  
The truth conditions for the sentence [Compact carsjF are still safe are as follows. 
(3 1 )  [[Compact cars]F are still safe] e,g = 1 iff safe(c-cars, de ) ; defined only if 
maxi d: safe(c-cars, d) } -< maxi d: safe (XEF , d) } 
According to this analysis of the contribution of still, we predict that the sentence 
in question is felicitous only in a context that entails that some salient type of car 
different from compact cars is safe to a degree greater than the degree to which 
compacts are safe. In this context, what is at issue is whether compact cars are safe 
or not, and the contribution of the assertion is to resolve this issue positively. This is 
a positive result since the sentence in (27) does not seem felicitous out-of-the-blue, 
but is only acceptable if there is a contextually salient alternative car that is safer to 
a higher degree. 1 8 ,  19  
3.2. Concessive still 
AN ANALYSIS OF STILL 
Consider the case of concessive still. I will take the following two sentences as the 
paradigmatic examples of this use of the particle. 
(32) A: [John studied all night]F .  
B :  He still failed the test, though. 
(33) Even if [the doctor tells him not to]F ,  Harry will still run the marathon. 
It seems fairly innocent to say that (32) asserts that John studied all night and that 
he failed the test this morning. But what does the sentence presuppose? The impli­
cation seems to be that his failing the test after having studied all night is somewhat 
unexpected. (33) suggests that Harry will run the marathon whether or not the 
doctor will tell him not to, and, again, that running a marathon despite a doctor's 
negative advice is not typical behavior. My proposal is that concessive still is a 
scalar particle, where the relevant ordering is the order of worlds according to their 
likelyhood with respect to a certain proposition. Take (32) . Worlds where John 
failed the exam are ordered according to how likely they are given our actual as­
sumptions. Analogously to the case of marginality still, the sentence asserts that 
John studied all night and failed the test in the actual world, and presupposes that 
the worlds maximally similar to the actual world in which John studies all night 
and fails the test are less likely than the maximally similar worlds where he does 
not study all night and fails the test. While marginality still added a presupposition 
to a property of degrees, concessive still is adds a presupposition to a property of 
worlds (a proposition) . The type of the latter still is ( ( s ,  t) (s ,  t) ) .  (34) is the struc­
ture for B 's sentence in (32) . The phrase the particle associates with is A's sentence 






( (st) (st) ) � 
he failed the test 
As customary in the literature on modality20 , the truth conditions for modal sen­
tences are relative to a notion of comparative similarity, according to which some 
worlds are more similar to the evaluation world than others. Modal operators quan­
tify over the worlds maximally similar to the evaluation world. As the meaning of 
concessive still shows below, comparison between worlds looks then very similar 
to comparison between degrees. The definition of the max operator is from von Fin­
tel (200 1 ) . -<likely means less likely. The proposition c is the contextually salient 
proposition, i .e. the proposition that the particle associates with. The left side of 
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the -<likely relation is the intersection of the set of p worlds (p being the proposition 
denoted by the complement of the particle) and the set of worlds where c is true. 
The right side of -<likely is the intersection of the set of p worlds and the set of 
worlds where -,c is true. This captures the meaning of (32), as shown in (35-c). 
(35) a. [still] g,e = )...P(st) : max�,wJw : w E pA w E C} -<likely max�,wJw' : 
W' E p A w' E -,c} . P 
b. For any proposition p, any similarity relation �, and any world w :  
max�,w (p) = {w' : p( w' ) = 1 & Vw" : p( w" ) = 1 � w' �w w"} 
c. [John still failed the test]g,e = 1 iff W e  E {w:  John failed the test 
in w} ; defined only if max�,w{ w: John studied all night in w and he 
failed the test in W} -<likely max�,w { W' : John didn' t  studied all night 
in w' and he failed the test in w'} 
The case of conditionals like (33) can be treated in a parallel fashion. All the worlds 
in which Harry runs the marathon are ordered according to how likely they are 
given our actual assumptions. The sentence asserts that in all the maximally similar 
worlds in which the doctor will tell Harry not to, Harry will run the marathon, and 
it presupposes that the maximally similar worlds in which the doctor tells him not 
to and he runs the marathon are less likely than the maximally similar worlds where 
the doctor does not tell him not to and he runs thec marathon. The focused phrase 
associate with still in the conditional case is the antecedent; so, the relevant salient 
proposition c is the proposition that the doctor tells Hary not to run the marathon. 
3.3. "Not-yet" still is an exclusive particle 
In this section I will consider what I have called the "not-yet" use of still.2 1 The 
example (36) instantiates this use ; the relevant reading is one in which it is not yet 
some later time (i .e. it is earlier than expected). 
(36) It is still [5 0' clock] x . 
What I will present in this section is a preliminary account of the meaning of not-yet 
still. The idea that I would like to propose here is that not-yet still is an exclusive 
particle, very similar to the meaning of only. If we can argue for this claim, then 
we will have argued that there are three types of still, one for each type of grading 
particle: an additive still, a scalar still and an exclusive still. The proposal is that 
still in (36) associates with the phrase 5 o 'clock and it contributes to the assertion a 
universal quantifier and a narrow scope negation as shown below. 
(37) \It : 5 -< t � -,(t = te) 
According to (37), (36) asserts that for all times t later than 5,  t is not the speech 
time. This makes not-yet still and only kins ; however, they differ in that the former 
selects only some of the alternatives to the associated phrase (5), i .e .  only those 
times that are later than 5. Now, (37) is not enough to capture the meaning of (36): 
just like only, the occurrence of still in (36) triggers the inference that (38) is true. 
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(38) It is (exactly) 5 o 'clock. 
I would like to suggest that (38) is a conversational implicature arising from the fact 
that the speaker chose to utter (36) instead of (39). 
(39) It is not 5 0 ' clock. 
Assuming that (37) is the assertive content of (36), (39) asymmetrically entails 
(36): if it is true that 5 is not now, then it is true that for no time t later than 5, 
t is now. However, it does not follow from the truth of the proposition that no 
time later than 5 is now, that now is not 5 .  Therefore, when the speaker uttered 
(36), the negation of (39) was conversationally implicated, i .e .  that it is 5 o'clock. 
Since the assertion in (36) is that it is no later than 5 o'clock, we expect (36) to be 
uttered in a context where what is at issue is whether it is or it is not later than 5 
o'clock.22 According to the present analysis, not-yet still is an exclusive particle 
much like only, and (38) is an implicature and not a presupposition. This analysis 
of still differs from the presuppositional analysis of only (Hom ( 1 969» , according 
to which (40-a) presupposes (40-b). 
(40) a. Only Mary got an A. 
b. Mary got an A. 
However, that (38) is a conversational implicature and not a presupposition is sug­
gested by the lack of projection in (41 ) .  
(41 )  a. It is possible that it is still 5 0' clock. 
b. Is it still 5 o'clock? 
Neither sentence in (41 )  suggests that it is 5 o 'clock at the speech time, which we 
would expect if the latter were a presupposition. Take (41 -a) . Since the sentence 
asserts that it is possible that there is no time later than 5 that is the speech time, 
the implicature that it is not 5 o'clock now is blocked by the fact that it is consistent 
with the epistemic state of the speaker that now is not 5 0 ' clock. For lack of space I 
cannot go into the details of this discussion (for which I refer the reader to Ippolito 
(2004» . Now, a presuppositional analysis of only seems problematic for precisely 
the same reasons presented above. Consider the not-yet only in (42-a) below. The 
assertive content must be (42-b). What about the implication in (42-c)? 
(42) a. It is only [5 o'clock]x 
b. \:It : 5 -< t --+ -,(  t = tc) 
c. It is 5 o'clock. 
It is possible to construct an example entirely parallel to (41 )  where the implica­
tion that it is 5 o 'clock is absent, thus casting doubt on the claim that (42-c) is a 
presupposition, and strengthening the hypothesis that it is an implicature. 
(43) It is possible that it is only 5 o'clock. 
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Clearly, (43) does not strongly suggest that it is 5 o ' clock, suggesting that (3) is not 
a presupposition. A similar point is noted by Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) with 
respect to non scalar uses of only as in (44). 
(44) It is possible that only Wilma guessed the secret word. 
According to their judgement, (44) does not suggest strongly that Wilma guessed 
the secret word, contrary to the presuppositional view of only. Now consider the 
negation of (42-a) . 
(45) It is not the case that it's only 5 o 'clock. 
The sentence asserts the negation of (42-b), i .e . that there is a time later than 5 that 
is the speech time. But if the speech time is some time later than 5 ,  then - by the 
logic of entailment - the speech time is also 5 .  Therefore, (42-c) is an entailment 
of (45) ,  even though it was only a conversational implicature of (42-a) . The same 
is true of the negation of (36) . 
(46) It is not the case that it is still 5 o 'clock. 
(46) entails that it is now 5 o 'clock, in the same way in which John has three 
children entails that John has one child.23 
4. Conclusion 
I presented a compositional analysis of the presupposition triggered by still. I have 
argued that the aspectual, not-yet, marginality and concessive uses of still fall into 
the classification of grading particles into the additive, scalar and exclusive classes. 
In particular, aspectual still is an additive particle, marginality and concessive still 
are scalar particles and, finally, non-yet still is an exclusive particle. With respect to 
exclusive still, I departed from the presuppositional view of exclusive particles and I 
suggested that exclusive still quantifies over a subset of the set of alternatives to the 
associate phrase, and that the implication that the predication holds of the associated 
phrase is not a presupposition but an implicature. In light of the discussion above, 
we might consider extend the analysis of only sketched above to all uses of this 
exclusive particle . 
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Notes 
I Some of the speakers I have asked did not accept this sentence with the intended meaning and 
could only express the intended reading by using only and just instead. I will go back to this issue 
in section 3 .4 when I discuss example (2). 
2The term concessive is from Michaelis ( 1993). 
3 Since the concessive readings is there when either even or still are present (If the doctor tells 
him not to, Harry will still run the marathon or Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will run 
the marathon), they seem to be independently responsible for the concessive reading. 
4Earlier analyses of still are Konig (1977) and Horn (1969) .  For an analysis of still in relation to 
already and to their negative polarity counteparts, anymore/any longer and yet, see Ippolito (2004) . 
5Heim's discussion is about the presupposition trigger to stop. 
6Stalnaker ( 1974), Stalnaker ( 1973), Heim ( 1982), and others 
7Heim (1990) refers to Soames (1989) for a similar argument concerning the presupposition of 
still. 
8See Karttunen and Peters ( 1979), Heim ( 1992), Ippolito (2003) .  
9This is important in his proposal in order to avoid Mittwoch's objection to LObner's analysis of 
already. 
IOTo stay with the rain example, Krifka's prediction seems to be that we should be able to utter 
(i) even if it never rainsed before: 
(i) If it were still raining, the movie theater would be more crowded. 
For lack of space, I cannot elaborate more on this and related issues. See Ippolito (2004) for a more 
detailed discussion of Krifka's proposal. 
I I  I will use the term eventuality as a cover term for both events and states. I will discuss later how 
events come into the semantics of predicates. 
1 2 As also noted by Kamp (2001),  the same is true of other presupposition triggers: again, already, 
too, also. In Kamp (2001)  Kamp investigates the problem of the computation of the presupposition 
of the particle again within the framework of DRT . I discuss this particle in section 2.3 in this paper. 
J3The meaning of the imperfective operator INO in Kratzer (1998) is: [ing] C,g 
>'P(l ,t} . >'e .>'t .  3e [t �time(e) 1\ P(e) = 1 ] . 
14For the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to assume the following denotation of the present 
tense: 
(i) [PRES]C,g = >'P.P(tc) 
Aspectual still requires that one of the alternatives in the focus value of the associated phrase (the 
tense) be a time earlier than the semantic value of that phrase. In our example in the text, since the 
focused phrase was PRES, the presupposition requires that there be a time before the speech time at 
which the complement. However, in the following example, since the associated focused phrase is 
FUT, it is required that one of the alternatives in the focus value of FUT be a time earlier than the 
semantic value of FUT, i.e. a time before the future time of the assertion. 
(ii) John will start cooking at 7pm tonight. He will still be cooking when tomorrow's game 
begins. 
Therefore, the presupposition triggered by still is that the eventuality of John's cooking that will 
overlap the future time when the game begins also overlapped a time before that future time. 
15The reason why utterances are appropriate only if they linguistically presuppose all that is ac­
tually presupposed in the common ground is not well-understood. However, the existence of such a 
requirement has been already noticed. (i) is from D. Pesetsky who attributes it to I. Heim. 
(i) (Ordering a second coffee from the same waitress:) 
a. #I'd like a coffee. 
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b. I'd like another coffee. 
1 6 As pointed out to me by Bill Ladusaw (p.c.) ,  the asymmetry between still and again pointed out 
above, i.e. the fact that, in the case of the former, both the assertion and the presupposition are about 
the same event, whereas, in the case of the latter, they are about different events, might explain why 
again but not still gives rise to the type of ambiguities already discussed in the literature: 
(i) I opened the door again. 
(ii) I am still opening the door. 
In (i) we can either infer that there was a previous situation in which the door had been opened, or 
that there was a previous state of the door been open. That is to say, even though the assertion is 
only about an event of me causing the door to open, there are two types of eventualities than can be 
presupposed: a eventuality of causing the door to open and an eventuality of the door being open. 
No such ambiguity is possible with still. For detailed discussions and analyses of the ambiguity of 
again, see von Stechow (1996), and Kamp (2001) .  
1 7See von Stechow (1984), Barker (2002), among others for alternatives .  See Kennedy and Mc­
Nally (2002) for a brief overview of the different theories. 
18The following exchange seems to sound strange when still is interpreted as a marginality particle 
(and not as the aspectual still): 
(i) A: You know so much about cars . Are compact cars safe? 
B: Well, they are still safe. 
19There is one question that at the moment I have no answer to, i .e. what happens when still 
occurs in comparatives. Consider the following interesting fact. Normally in a comparative sentence, 
neither of the degrees that are compared is required to be as great as the standard of comparison: 
(i) Ann's house is bigger than Mary's, but they're both small. 
However, when the comparative occurs with still things change: 
(ii) X is a way to solve the problem. A still more efficient way to solve the problem is Y. 
The second clause asserts that Y is a more efficient way to solve the problem than X, but it also 
implicates that X was efficient (that is, as efficient as the relevant standard of efficiency in the 
context) . As of now, this question remains unanswered. 
20Lewis (1973), Kratzer ( 1981) ,  Kratzer (199 1) ,  Fintel (2001) ,  among others. 
21 Before I begin the discussion, let me point out that English speakers seem to be split in two 
categories: those that accept this use of the particle and those who do not. Interestingly for the 
analysis that I am about to suggest above, the last group uses only or a combination of still and only. 
Age and place of origin did not seem to be relevant factors to explain the different dialects . I suspect 
that, when the topic of this paper is looked from a more cross-linguistic perspective (as I plan to do 
in the future),  the not-yet use of still and its counterparts in other languages will be found to vary 
greatly. Here below, I have quoted a couple of attested uses of not-yet still from the web: 
(i) Maria: Eat? It's still lOam! Michael: So what? I deserve a god lunch ! Maria: Lunch is for 
noon. Michael: Whatever. 
(http://www.geocities.com/prdigitalforce/episode20.html) 
(ii) Got an A! I was jumping for joy (internally, keep in mind it's still 8am) . 
(http://graharnhensley.info/oldnews.htm) 
22Krifka (1998) suggests that sentences are answers to implicit questions that are indicated by 
focus. 
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231 believe that this story about the alleged presupposition of still can be extended to non scalar 
uses of still as well such as the one in (40-a) in the text. See Ippolito (2004) for more. 
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